On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense

1. IntroductionIn the following I volition deem Nietzsches rise On fair play and Lies in a nonmoral whizz. get I provide look at a small ingredient of this to repel out his statuss on homosexualner of speaking, then I will examine the whole of the try in monastic browse to consider his put on of illustration, metonymy and anthropomorphisms in detail. This examination will lead, by style of a consideration of the ship counseling in which he routines fable and contrasting devices, into a consideration of his tunes regarding the character of voice communication. I will put forward the spate that his beation of the character of diction undermines itself as it seeks to put itself forward as a verity while denying that trueness exists as such.2. Truth and LanguageFirst, I consider the flight which st arts What then is legality. In this passage, Nietzsche postulates to experience the flexible and changing tint of nomenclature. The statements which we ta ke as virtue, fair and lax to visualize, were in position originally more(prenominal) equal to verse in their relationship with how things genuinely be. Language which was originally exercisingd in a allegoryic, metonymic or hu homohood universes way has doomed the vital military persuasiveness of the original statements, the original power of the symbolic spend of speech has render lost and nevertheless a shell remains.Over cartridge clip the non- typo original sense has be beget literal so we take the words as a straightforwardly sure or false statement. In the original use of expression, people could under root that the call were non meant literally b bely a plenteous and evocative picture of how things are. This gamyness has become lost and we are left only with the empty structural force of the language, which we interpret as simple truth.This is my overall catch of this split up. However it is difficult to paraphrase accurately, overdue to the richness of the language Nietzsche uses. We could in fact say that his contention that truths are illusions which we take up forgotten are illusions is couched in terms which are in themselves heavily fableical, so atomic number 53r than the propositions which would be easy to paraphrase.Truth, in the paragraph in question, is a movable array, an illusion, something which is drained of sensuous force and a coin. The associations of these are rich, hardly non necessarily reconcilable. A coin, for instance, is non an illusion as it is an ein truthday element of economic exchange. T presentfore, the most important aspect of Nietzsches bloodline would reckon to be that it is not a conventional descent earlier he uses poetry and illustration to demonstrate the disposition or language, rather than beg off it in a shade by measure way.I now rick to the larger testify of which this quotation is a pop out. There are a array of metaphors, metonymies and anthropomorphisms in it1, and as pointed out in the question it is easy to take out these. I will pick out a few of these to discuss wherefore it is easy to overlook them. Part of the reason would seem to be that the text is simply so gravid with them. In some execrations, some(prenominal) of these devices being crammed into it. Take, for example, the fresh gentle spell few sentences (1). macrocosm history is depict as arrogant and mendacious an anthropomorphic device ascribing human characteristics to an abstract notion.Nature, likewise, is state to draw a few breaths which combines anthropomorphism with the metaphor of winning a while to pause. Later in the homogeneous paragraph, nature is said to clotheshorse up like a wallow which again combines metaphor and anthropomorphism. As swell as the denseness with which these devices are packed, it is likewise the case that a more translucent device masks whizz in the same sentence which is less flamboyant. For example, in the sentence quoted immediately supra, nature is as well as described as reprehensible a quality which properly speaking should really be ascribed to humans only. This less noticeable anthropomorphism somehow comes across as a literal statement. I suspect this is part of Nietzsches intention, as it collections the way in which language trick slip from being thoroughly poetical to less plain so.The favorable organisation of his establish work to accent this. Passages of a less metaphoric or metonymic nature occur in between passages where the use of these devices, together with anthropomorphism, is dense. For example, Nietzsche discusses (4) how metaphor is involved in every beat of verbalization and conceptualization from sense intuition to abstract terms. This backchat is couched in level offhandedly straightforward language without obvious use of metaphor and the like.Passages such as these are, yet, caboodle against whizzs in which the language is dense with poetic devices, wh ere, as Nietzsche says at that place is a negotiable host of metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms (5). Such poetic passages overtop a variant type of reading, one in which we are forced to admit language as the dense and scene-packed structure Nietzsche would rescue us believe it is in its entirety. In other(a) words, I would book out that the mixing of metaphorical passages with more straightforward ones is a device intended to incite us of the inherently metaphorical nature of all words.Another way in which Nietzsche uses the devices reinforces the above. The metaphorical, metonymic and anthropomorphic passages provide a splendid and strong illustration of his points in the more straightforward branchs. For example, he talks just virtually(predicate) mans need for deceitfulness (2) a continuous fluttering virtually the solitary flame of vanity. The visual image thus constructed powerfull reiterates the later points he makes more or less the nature of t ruth and the value it plays for mankind. He appeals, as it were, to both our intellect and our senses.Section twain of the essay is rich in out-of-the-way use of metaphor and other devices. Perhaps the most dense passage occurs at the end, where Nietzsche talks about intuitive (as opposed to rational) man. He pile device upon device to reiterate the way he portays intuitive man. He is said to reap a harvest from his intuition, hardly Nietzsche takes the strange step of elaborating this metaphor in another direction, for what man reaps is continually influent illumination, a metaphor one would associate with a river, not a harvest.I believe Nietzsche compounds metaphors in this way in distinguish to demonstrate that the sense of what he is saying is not straightforward but has depths and resonates in unalike directions. It is similarly unusual that these two metaphors hide another, at the start outning of the sentence, where man is said to be stand in the midst of a compa nionableization. Here one could roughly overlook the metaphoric nature of the expression, as it is polish to a common-sense expression. Id counsel that here Nietzsche is victimization the more unusual figures of speech as a way of alerting us to the metaphorical nature of all expression, including cases like this where the metaphor has almost passed into ordinary use.Another remarkable passage starts section two. Here the scientist is described as twist his hut, which is equated with his understanding of the world. The imagery here is especially rich and evocative, drawing up a visual image of a towering structure. It would seem that Nietzsche uses such particular(prenominal)ly visual imagery to introduce his discussion of dreams, for the words evoke images akin to dreaming consciousness.A final point I would make about the use of metaphorical devices centers on his use of different metaphors (in this case with an living creature theme) to reinforce his points. For example, w hen talking about the conditioning of conceptualization, he compares it to both building upon a spiders web and to a bees building with wax (7). earlier in the same passage he talks of this conceptualization in the context of use of the Roman gods. Because he repeats metaphors taken from levels above and below that of man, it is as if he is creating an over-metaphor which draws financial aid to mans nature and its acuity from the animal kingdom and that of the gods, which in function serves to reinforce his notion of the subjectivity of language and perception.I now turn to the everyday points do about language in the essay as a whole. Firstly, I will give an over befool of the essay itself before round to a critique of Nietzsches points. The essay divides into two parts, and the tone of each is some different. The first contains more argument of a philosophical nature, although in the context of rhetorical passages, whereas the second is more lyrical in tone throughout. In part one, Nietzche discusses mans intellect. We think we are the plaza of the universe, and that our companionship is a special thing, but so do the most blue members of the animal kingdom.Our nature is inherantly deceptive, not aimed towards truth, however due to social constraints we feel it demand to embrace truth in order to become part of a social world. He then turns to the nature of truth, which for Neitzsche is inherantly unreal and based on metaphor. Looking at the way in which we come to understand the world, this is based not on an certain coherence to things in themselves but an illusion, even at the most basic perceptual stage. Likewise concepts and abstractions have no inherant partnership to the real state of the world.The moral relish towards truth is nothing more than a Darwinian survival of the fittest. Man layaboutnot take out the trap of his inherantly metaphorical stand, which is also peculiar(prenominal) to the human species alone. However, to give ourselves a sense of security, we have to forget the metaphorical nature of understanding and take our experience as an experience of how things really are. Nietzsche concludes part one with a summary of the subjectivity of mans experience.Part two has a different tone, being more poetical overall. He starts by dismissing the claims of science to impart general truths which hold for all time. He reiterates that the draw a bead on to metaphor is the most important. Dreams are a way in which we commode begin to understand the richness of the creative and metaphorical drive for what it is, a drive which is obvious from the scientific, rational one. In this section, Nietzsche seems to be hinting, against the first section, that through dreams and art man can perhaps come to an understanding of the social occasion metaphor plays in language and truth.Nietzsche makes several(prenominal) general assertions about the nature of language in his essay. His foremost point is that language is inherently metaphorical. As pointed out, he reiterates this by use of the type of device he believes is a model of language. This, I think, is the aboriginal theme of his essay, and one which, by his use of language, he puts across most subtlety. However, in that respect seems to be a trouble with his view point. He seems to be taking the viewpoint of someone who can say what is true and what is not.He wants to say that truth as we savvy it is an illusion, but does not explain why we should believe his illusion rather than whatever other. He does not merely want to raise by poetic devices that truth is an illusion, but to argue that this is the case. He wants to do philosophy, not poetry, and philosophy is concerned with using rational argument to put forward ones own case, and dismiss opposing views. The problem is that any argument he uses to abet his own view also works against this view.I believe Nietzsches other points are flawed also. Mans nature, he contends, is to deceive himself, and this, he postulates, is for a Darwinian end, the survival of the individual (2). The first brain of the individual is self-preservation, and hence to deceive. However, social forces come into play if man wants to exist gayly with others he cannot be seen to tell lies, that is, to protest with the herd. Therefore the desire for truth comes into play.Truth is utilitarian to society. Man does not desire truth for his own sake, as the philosophers say, rather he desires the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth (3). Nietzsche thus postulates a socially driven theory of truth, where the quest for knowledge is an illusion, and social reality the only reality. My argument with this would be it fails to explain cases where individuals act in a way which they know will make their position in their social group uncomfortable and unpleasant, and do so because they want to find the truth.Nietzsche talks about the way in which humans develop language to argue th at metaphor is of all time present from original sense perceptions (3-4). He says a nerve stimulus is transferred into an image first metaphor (4). After this, he says, each subsequent stage is also built upon metaphor. However, I would argue that in order to distinguish a metaphor as such, we need to have a concept of how things really are, in order that we can know when descriptions are metaphorical (that is, not literal). If, as Nietzsche argues, metaphor exists from the very first act of perception, then how can we make sense of a bankers bill between metaphor and non-metaphor?There is also, I believe, a confusion in the essay about the status of what Nietzsche proposes. He suggests that man had to erase the understanding of the metaphorical nature of language from his consciousness in order to live with any sense of security, and also that if man could escape from the confines of this prison-like viewpoint, his vanity would be immediately destroyed (8). This suggests that man is permanently trapped in the view of language as a truth bearing vehicle, unable to see things as they really are.This is problematic in two ways. First, that Nietzsche obviously thinks he can stand outside this language trap in order to explain how others are fix by it. Secondly, he seems to suggest at the same time that man can come to the realization that the nature of language and indeed life is other than he believes it to be, which assumes that the prison of language is one that can, and should be overcome. This confusion seems at least partly to derive from the two sections of the essay, which are different in tone. In the second section he seems to be saying that art is one way in which man can free himself from the confines of language and confuse the conceptual categories and cells by carry forward new transferences, metaphors, and metonymies (10).3. ConclusionIn the above, I have try a brief summary of Nietzsches essay. I have attempted to bring out his central poin t, that language is essentially metaphorical, and also to look his other discussions of the nature language and truth plays for man. I have looked at the ways in which he uses metaphor, metonymy and anthropomorphism in different ways, each of which underline his central ideas about language. I have tried to show that, for me, his arguments although subtle and dense are ultimately not coherent, as he tries to step outside the framework of metaphor to explain how things really are.I also suggest that although Nietzsche is attempting philosophy, to convince the reader that he has a valid thesis and to present the argument for this, it is difficult to rejoinder his case fully as he uses the resources of a poet as well as a philosopher. It is not within the brief to use poetry and metaphor to answer Nietzsche, so theres a sense in which I am unable to answer him on his own terms.1 briefly, a metaphor is when one thing is compared to another by saying a is b or similar, for example my h eart is a arising, where b is something which a is not usually literally said to be. Metonymy is where a get of something is used as a stenography for the thing itself. For example, a school chela might refer to a particular teacher as big nestle. Finally anthropomorphism is when human characteristics are ascribed to animals Nietzsches use seems also to overwhelm the ascription of specifically human traits to an neutral non-human world.